The smallest detail, taken from the actual incident in war, is more
instructive for me, a soldier, than all the Thiers and Jominis in the world.
They speak, no doubt, for the heads of states and armies but they never
show me what I wish to know-a battalion, a company, a squad, in action.|
ARDANT DU PICQ, Battle Studies
The N.K. 6th, farthest to the west of the enemy divisions, had
a special mission. After the fall of Seoul, it followed the N.K. 3d
and 4th Divisions across the Han as far as Ch'onan. There the N.K.
Army issued new orders to it, and pursuant to them on 11 July it turned
west off the main highway toward the west coast. For the next two weeks
the division passed from the view of Eighth Army intelligence. Various
intelligence summaries carried it as location unknown, or placed it vaguely
in the northwest above the Kum River.
Actually, the 6th Division was moving rapidly south over
the western coastal road net. Its shadow before long would turn into a
pall of gloom and impending disaster over the entire U.N. plan to defend
southern Korea. Its maneuver was one of the most successful of either Army
in the Korean War. It compelled the redisposition of Eighth Army at the
end of July and caused Tokyo and Washington to alter their plans for the
conduct of the war.
Departing Yesan on 13 July, the N.K. 6th Division started
south in two columns and crossed the lower Kum River. (See Map
III.) The larger force appeared before Kunsan about the time the
3d and 4th Divisions attacked Taejon. The port town
fell to the enemy without resistance. The division's two columns united
in front of Chonju, thirty miles to the southeast, and quickly reduced
that town, which was defended by ROK police. 
The N.K. 6th Division was now poised to make an end run
through southwest Korea toward Pusan, around the left flank of Eighth Army.
In all Korea southwest of the Taejon-Taegu-Pusan highway, at this time,
there were only a few hundred survivors of the ROK 7th Division, some scattered ROK marines, and local police units. 
The 6th Division departed Chonju on or about 20 July.
At Kwangju on 23 July the three regiments of the division separated. The
13th went southwest to Mokp'o on the coast, the 14th south
to Posong, and the 15th southeast through Sunch'on to Yosu on the
southern coast. The division encountered little resistance during this
week of almost constant movement. About 25 July, it reassembled at Sunch'on,
ninety air miles west of Pusan, and made ready for its critical drive eastward
toward that port. Logistically, the division was poorly prepared for this
operation. Its supply was poor and rations were cut in half and on some
days there were none. 
Advancing next on Chinju, General Pang Ho San, commander of the N.K.
6th Division, proclaimed to his troops on the eve of the
advance, "Comrades, the enemy is demoralized. The task given us is
the liberation of Masan and Chinju and the annihilation of the remnants
of the enemy.... The liberation of Chinju and Masan means the final battle
to cut off the windpipe of the enemy." 
Everywhere refugees fled the terror sweeping over southwest Korea with
the advance of the North Korean Army and guerrilla units. An entry on 29
July in the diary of a guerrilla tellingly illustrates the reasons for
panic: "Apprehended 12 men; National Assembly members, police sergeants
and Myon leaders. Killed four of them at the scene, and the remaining eight
were shot after investigation by the People's court." 
During the battle for Taejon, U.N. aerial observers had reported enemy
movements south of the Kum River near the west coast. U.N. intelligence
mistakenly concluded that these troops were elements of the N.K. 4th
Division. A report from the Far East Command to Washington on 21
July noted this enemy movement and attributed it to that division. The
next day a similar report from the Far East Command stated, "The 4th
North Korean Division ... has been picked up in assemblies in the vicinity
of Nonsan." Enemy forces in battalion and regimental strength, the
report said, were moving in a "southward trend, colliding with local
police forces." General MacArthur's headquarters considered this "a
very bold movement, evidently predicated on the conviction of the enemy
high command that the Allied units are potentially bottled up in the mountainous
areas northeast of the headwaters of the Kum River. ... The potential of
the advance of the enemy 4th Division to the south is altogether
uncomfortable, since at the moment, except for air strikes, there is no
organized force capable of firm resistance except local police units."
General Walker knew enemy units were moving south of the Kum River into
southwest Korea and maintained aerial observation of the roads there when
flying weather conditions permitted. His intelligence section wanted distant
armored reconnaissance of this region, but the armored vehicles and personnel
to carry it out were not available. In addition to aerial reconnaissance,
however, there were the many reports from local South Korean police units.
These often were vague, conflicting, and, it was thought, exaggerated.
On 21-22 July, heavy overcast prevented aerial reconnaissance and permitted
the enemy to put his columns on the road during daylight and to move rapidly
without fear of aerial attack. Alarm at Eighth Army headquarters began
to grow. The Fifth Air Force had moved its advance headquarters from Itazuke,
Japan, to Taegu on 16 July. The most advanced air bases in Japan-Itazake
and Ashiya-were hardly close enough to the battle area of early and middle
July to allow more than fifteen to twenty minutes of support by jet fighters.
When weather was bad the F-80 jets could scarcely fly a mission at the
front and get back to Itazuke. Effective 24 July, the advance group of
the Air Force was designated as the Fifth Air Force in Korea. Fair weather
returned on 23 July, and General Walker requested the Fifth Air Force to
fly an armed reconnaissance of the Kwangju-Nonsan area. 
When General Walker asked for aerial reconnaissance of southwest Korea
on 23 July, he had at hand a G-2 estimate of the enemy situation in the
west below the Kum, just provided at his request. This estimate postulated
that elements of one division were in the southwest. It estimated the rate
of progress at two miles an hour and calculated that if the enemy turned
east he could reach the Anui-Chinju line in the Chiri Mountains by 25 July.
 This proved to be an accurate forecast.
The air reconnaissance carried out on 23 July was revealing. It showed
that enemy forces had indeed begun a drive south from the estuary of the
Kum River and were swinging east behind the left (west) flank of Eighth
On the basis of the time and space estimate given him on the 23d and
the aerial reconnaissance of the same date, General Walker realized that
a major crisis was developing in a section far behind the lines, and at
a time when constant enemy attack was pushing his front back. On 24 July,
Eighth Army made its first move to counter the threatened enemy envelopment
in the southwest. General Walker decided to send the 24th Division posthaste
southward to block the enemy enveloping move. He also directed his chief
of staff, Colonel Landrum, personally to make sure that the Fifth Air Force
made a major effort against the enemy forces in southwest Korea. 
At noon on the 24th, General Walker asked General Church, the new commander
of the 24th Division, to come to Eighth Army headquarters in Taegu. There
Walker informed him of the threat in the southwest and told him that he
would have to move the 24th Division to the sector. "I am sorry to
have to do this," he said, "but the whole left flank is open,
and reports indicate the Koreans are moving in. I want you to cover the
area from Chinju up to near Kumch'on."  The two places General
Walker mentioned are sixty-five air miles apart and separated by the wild
General Church had assumed command of the 24th Division just the day
before, on 23 July, after General Dean had been three days missing in action.
The division had been out of the line and in army reserve just one day.
It had not had time to re-equip and receive replacements for losses. The
division supply officer estimated that 60 to 70 percent of the division's
equipment would have to be replaced. All three regiments were far understrength.
General Church immediately ordered the 19th Infantry to move to Chinju,
and it started from Kumch'on shortly before midnight, 24 July. The next
day, 25 July, at 1700, Eighth Army formally ordered the division, less
the 21st Regiment, to defend the Chinju area. 
Eighth Army now had reports of 10 enemy tanks and 500 infantry in Mok'po
at the southwest tip of the peninsula; 26 trucks and 700 soldiers in Namwon;
tanks, trucks, and 800 soldiers in Kurye; and 500 enemy troops engaging
South Korean police in Hadong.  The Eighth Army G-2 estimated at this
time that the N.K. 4th Division was dispersed over 3,300 square
miles of southwest Korea.
On the morning of 25 July, Col. Ned D. Moore arrived at Chinju about
0600, preceding his 19th Infantry Regiment headquarters and the 2d Battalion,
which reached the town at 1500 in the afternoon. Lt. Col. Robert L. Rhea,
following with the 1st Battalion, remained behind on the Kumch'on road
north of Chinju. There, at Anui, where a road came in from the west, Colonel
Rhea placed A Company in a defensive position. The remainder of the battalion
continued south eight miles to a main road junction at Umyong-ni (Sanggam
on some old maps and Hwasan-ni on others), just east of Hamyang. 
The next day, 26 July, Col. Charles E. Beauchamp's 34th Infantry Regiment,
on orders from General Church, moved from the Kunwi-Uisong area north of
Taegu to Koch'ang. At the same time the 24th Division headquarters and
divisional troops moved to Hyopch'on, where General established his command post. Hyopch'on is 12 air mile west of the Naktong River, 25
miles north of Chinju, and 15 miles southeast of Koch'ang. It was reasonably
well centered in the vast area the division had to defend. 
Of the eleven infantry battalions re quested by General MacArthur in
early July to make up shortages within the infantry divisions of the Far
East Command, two battalions from the 19th Infantry Regiment on Okinawa
were the first to arrive in Korea. The history of these units between the
time they were alerted for probable combat use in Korea and their commitment
in battle shows the increasing sense of urgency that gripped the Far East
Command in July, and how promises and estimates made one day in good faith
had to be discarded the next because of the growing crisis in Korea. And
it also shows how troops not ready for combat nevertheless suddenly found
themselves in it.
About the middle of July, Maj. Tony J. Raibl, Executive Officer, 3d
Battalion, 19th Infantry, learned in Tokyo that the Far East Command expected
that the regiment would have at least six weeks' training before being
sent to Korea. 
Yet, immediately after making that estimate, the Far East Command issued
orders to the regiment on 15 July to prepare for movement. All troops were
placed in two battalions, the 1st and 3d. Lt. Col. Wesley C. Wilson commanded
the 1st Battalion and Lt. Col. Harold W. Mott, the 3d Battalion. The regimental
headquarters was to remain behind as a nucleus for a new regiment that
would assume responsibility for the ground defense of Okinawa.
The USS Walker arrived at Okinawa on the 20th with about 400
recruits. They were hastily disembarked and allowed to take with them only
their toilet articles, driven to the battalion areas, assigned to companies,
issued arms and field equipment, and moved back to the Naha docks. On 21
July the two battalions, now at full strength, loaded on board the Fentriss
and Takasago Maru during a heavy rain and sailed for Pusan.
On 20 July at Yokohama, Major Raibl learned that the two battalions
would not come to Japan but would sail directly for Korea, where they would
receive at least ten days of intensive field training in the vicinity of
Pusan before they would be committed. When Major Raibl arrived at Taegu
on 22 July, he found Col. Allan D. MacLean, Eighth Army Assistant G-3,
in no mood to listen to or discuss the lack of combat readiness of the
19th Infantry. Raibl talked at length with General Walker, who was sympathetic
but indicated that the situation was urgent. When he left Taegu, Raibl
understood that the two battalions would have a minimum of three days at
Pusan to draw equipment and zero-in and test fire their weapons. 
Instead, when the two battalions disembarked at Pusan the morning of
24 July orders from Eighth Army awaited them to proceed to Chinju. There
they would be attached to the 19th Infantry Regiment. The next afternoon
the two battalions arrived at Chinju. Instead of the six weeks of training
first agreed upon, they found themselves now in a forward position, rifles
not zeroed, mortars not test-fired, and new .50-caliber machine guns with
cosmoline rubbed off but not cleaned. 
That evening, 25 July, Colonel Mott received orders from Colonel Moore,
commanding the 19th Infantry at Chinju, to seize Hadong, a road junction
point thirty-five miles southwest of Chinju. Colonel Moore said that about
500 N.K. troops were moving on Hadong and comprised the nearest enemy organized
resistance. Maj. Gen. Chae Byong Duk, formerly ROK Army Chief of Staff
and now in Chinju, urged on Colonel Moore the importance of Hadong in controlling
the western approach to Chinju and the desirability of holding it. He offered
to accompany any force sent to Hadong. Colonel Moore gave Chae permission
to accompany the troops; he had no command function-he was merely to serve
as an interpreter, guide, and adviser to Colonel Mott.
The Trap at Hadong
At dusk, 25 July, the 3d Battalion issued a warning order to its units
to be prepared to move at 2230 that night, with the mission of seizing
Hadong. Colonel Mott and Major Raibl based their plans on the assumption
that the battalion would reach Hadong before daylight. They expected that
some enemy troops would already be in the town.
Half an hour after midnight the motorized battalion started for Hadong.
General Chae and some other ROK officers guided the column south out of
Chinju through Konyang, where it turned north to strike the main Chinju-Hadong
road at Wonjon. In taking this route they had detoured from the direct
road because of an impassable ford. The column spent the entire night trying
to negotiate the narrow road and pulling vehicles out of rice paddies.
A little after daylight, the battalion encountered a truck traveling
south containing 15 to 20 badly shot-up South Koreans. They claimed to
be the only survivors of about 400 local militia at Hadong, which the North
Koreans had attacked the night before. Pondering this grave information,
Colonel Mott led the battalion on to Wonjon on the main road. There he
halted the battalion for breakfast and set up security positions. Mott
and Raibl decided that Colonel Moore should know about the happenings at
Hadong and, since the battalion did not have radio communication with the
19th Infantry in Chinju, Raibl set out by jeep to tell him.
At Chinju, Raibl told Colonel Moore and Major Logan the story related
by the wounded South Koreans. He requested authority for the 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, to dig in on a defensive position west of Chinju to cover
the Hadong road. After considerable discussion, Colonel Moore told Raibl
that the battalion should continue on and seize Hadong. Major Raibl accepted
the order reluctantly since he thought the battalion could not accomplish
this mission. Major Raibl returned to Wonjon shortly after noon and informed
Colonel Mott of the instructions.
Colonel Mott stopped the battalion at dusk at the village of Hoengch'on,
situated about three miles from Hadong on a bend of the tortuous mountain
An Air Force captain with a radio jeep and a tactical air control party
arrived a little later. His mission was to direct air strikes the next
day and provide communication for the battalion. But en route his radio
had become defective and now he could not establish communication with
The battalion moved out from Hoengch'on-ni at approximately 0845, 27
July. Capt. George F. Sharra and L Company, with a platoon of the Heavy
Weapons Company, were in the lead, followed by the battalion command group
and K, M, and I Companies, in that order. Sharra was an experienced rifle
company commander, having seen action in Africa, Sicily, France, and Germany
in World War II.
When he was about 1,000 yards from the top of the Hadong pass, Sharra
saw a patrol of ten or twelve enemy soldiers come through the pass and
start down toward him. The Heavy Weapons platoon fired their two 75-mm.
recoilless rifles at the patrol but the rounds passed harmlessly overhead.
The enemy patrol turned and ran back over the pass. Captain Sharra ordered
L Company to dash to the top of the pass and secure it. His men reached
the top and deployed on either side of the pass. It was now about 0930.
Sharra received orders for L Company to dig in and wait for an air strike
on Hadong scheduled for 0944. 
The road climbed to the top of the pass along the southern shoulder
of a high mountain in a series of snakelike turns, and then started downward
to Hadong a mile and a half westward. A high peak on the right (north)
towered over the road at the pass; to the left the ground dropped away
rapidly to flat paddy land along the Sumjin River.
The command group, including Colonel Mott, Captain Flynn, and most of
the battalion staff, now hurried forward to the pass. General Chae and
his party accompanied Colonel Mott. Captain Sharra pointed out to Colonel
Mott unidentified people moving about on the higher ground some distance
to the north. Mott looked and replied, "Yes, I have K Company moving
up there." Raibl, at the rear of the column, received orders from
Mott to join him at the pass, and he hurried forward.
As the battalion command group gathered in the pass, Captain Sharra,
thinking that it made an unusually attractive target, walked over to the
left and dropped to the ground beside the gunner of a light machine gun.
Raibl arrived at the pass. He saw that L Company was deployed with two
platoons on the left of the pass and one platoon on the right, and that
K Company was climbing toward higher ground farther to the north.
Colonel Mott directed Raibl's attention down the road toward Hadong.
Around a curve came a column of enemy soldiers marching on either side
of the road. Sharra also saw it. He directed his machine gunner to withhold
fire until the column was closer and he gave the word. The enemy soldiers
seemed unaware that American troops were occupying the pass.
Standing beside Raibl in the pass, General Chae watched the approaching
soldiers, apparently trying to determine their identity. Some appeared
to be wearing American green fatigue uniforms and others the mustard brown
of the North Korean Army. When the approaching men were about 100 yards
away, General Chae shouted to them in Korean, apparently asking their identity.
At this, they scampered to the ditches without answering. The machine guns
of L Company then opened fire. Sharra, who had the column in clear view,
estimates it comprised a company. 
Almost simultaneously with the opening of American fire, enemy machine
gun, mortar, and small arms fire swept over the pass from the high ground
to the north. The first burst of enemy machine gun fire struck General
Chae in the head and a great stream of blood spurted from the wound. He
died instantly. Korean aides carried his body back to a vehicle. The same
machine gun fire hit Major Raibl. He rolled down the incline to get out
of the line of fire. Colonel Mott, the S-2, and the Assistant S-2 were
also wounded by this initial enemy fire into the pass. Enemy mortars apparently
had been registered on the pass, for their first rounds fell on the road
and knocked out parked vehicles, including the TACP radio jeep. Captain
Flynn, unhurt, dropped to the ground and rolled down from the pass. In
the first minute of enemy fire the 3d Battalion staff was almost wiped
Just after the fight opened, Major Raibl saw two flights of two planes
each fly back and forth over the area, apparently trying vainly to contact
the TACP below. They finally flew off without making any strikes. Raibl
was wounded again by mortar fragments and went down the hill seeking a
medical aid man. Meanwhile, Colonel Mott, wounded only slightly by a bullet
crease across the back, got out of the line of fire. He was just below
the pass helping to unload ammunition when a box dropped, breaking his
foot. A soldier dug him a foxhole. As the fighting developed, everyone
in Mott's vicinity was either killed or wounded, or had withdrawn down
the hill. Very soon, it appears, no one knew where Mott was. 
In the pass a hard fight flared between L Company and the North Koreans
higher up the hill. On the right-hand (north) side of the road, 2d Lt.
J. Morrissey and his 1st Platoon bore the brunt of this fight. The enemy
was just above them and the machine gun that had all but wiped out the
battalion group in the road was only 200 yards from the pass. Enemy soldiers
immediately came in be-
tween them and elements of K Company that were trying to climb the hill
higher up. These North Koreans attacked Morrissey's men in their foxholes,
bayoneting two of them. Morrissey proved a capable leader, however, and
his men held their position despite numerous casualties.
Across the road on the south side of the pass, Captain Sharra and the
2d Platoon gave supporting fire to Morrissey's men. Sharra had only voice
communication with his three platoons. It is a tribute to the officers,
the noncommissioned officers, and the rank and file, half of them young
recruits freshly arrived from the United States, that L Company held steadfast
in its positions on both sides of the pass against enemy fire and attack
from commanding terrain. The North Korean soldiers exposed themselves recklessly
and many must have been killed or wounded.
Captain Flynn hastened down from the pass at the beginning of the fight
to hurry up the supporting elements of the battalion. Down the road he
found part of the Heavy Weapons Company and part of K Company. He ordered
a platoon of K Company to attack up the hill, and talked by radio with
the company commander, Capt. Joseph K. Donahue, who was killed later in
the day. Flynn continued on down the road looking for I Company.
Coming to the battalion trains, Flynn had the wounded, including Major
Raibl, loaded on the trucks and started them back to Chinju. Farther in
the rear, Flynn found 1st Lt. Alexander G. Makarounis and I Company. He
ordered Makarounis to move the companyinto the gap between L and K Companies. Flynn started one of its platoons
under MSgt. James A. Applegate into the rice paddies on the left of the
road, where he thought it could get cover from the dikes in crossing a
large, horseshoe-shaped bowl in its advance toward the enemy-held hill
About noon, 2d Lt. Ernest Philips of L Company came to Captain Sharra
in the pass and told him he had found Colonel Mott, wounded, a short distance
away. Philips went back and carried Mott to Sharra's position. Mott told
Sharra to take over command of the battalion and to get it out.
Sharra sent instructions to his three platoons to withdraw to the road
at the foot of the pass. His runner to Lieutenant Morrissey and the 1st
Platoon on the north side of the pass never reached them. As the L Company
men arrived at the trucks they loaded on them, and at midafternoon started
On the way back to Chinju this group met B Battery, 13th Field Artillery
Battalion, which had started for Hadong on Colonel Moore's orders at 0800
that morning. The artillery battery had moved slowly with many stops for
reconnaissance. It now turned around and went back to Chinju, abandoning
one 105-mm. howitzer and four 2 1/2-ton trucks that became bogged down
in rice paddies. 
Meanwhile, a radio message from Colonel Mott reached Flynn near the top of the pass, ordering all elements
still on the hill to withdraw. Flynn climbed to a point where he could
call to Lieutenant Morrissey, still holding out on the right of the pass,
and told him to withdraw.
Morrissey had twelve men left; he and one other were wounded. The unidentified
Air Force captain with the TACP had fought all day as a rifleman with Morrissey's
platoon and had distinguished himself by his bravery. Now he was either
dead or missing. Captain Mitchell, the battalion S-2, likewise had fought
all day as a rifleman but he lived to withdraw. Morrissey's riflemen fell
back down the road to the waiting vehicles and wearily climbed in. When
all were accounted for, Captain Flynn started them for Chinju. Then, getting
into his own Jeep, he found it would not run.
Flynn clambered down to the low ground south of the road. In the rice
paddies he saw many men of I Company. Looking back at the pass he saw enemy
troops coming down off the hill, perhaps a battalion or more of them. Mortar
and machine gun fire now swept the paddy area. The men caught there had
to cross a deep, 20-foot-wide stream to escape, and many drowned in the
attempt. Most men rid themselves of helmet, shoes, nearly all clothing,
and even their weapons in trying to cross this stream.
Flynn got across and, in a little valley about a mile and a half away,
he found perhaps sixty to seventy other American soldiers. While they rested
briefly, enemy fire suddenly came in on them from pursuers and they scattered
like quail seeking cover. Flynn and three companions walked all night.
The next afternoon his party, now numbering ten men, entered the lines
of the 19th Infantry.
The largest single group of survivors escaped by going south to the
seacoast, only a few miles distant. Sergeant Applegate of I Company led
one group of ninety-seven men to the coast, where a Korean fishing vessel
took them on board at Noryangjin, five miles south of Hadong. From there
the vessel went west to a point near Yosu, where it transferred the men
to a Korean naval patrol vessel which returned them to Pusan. 
The morning that Mott's battalion approached Hadong, 27 July, Captain
Barszcz received orders to take his G Company, 19th Infantry, from Chinju
on a motorized patrol along secondary roads northeast of Hadong. He mounted
his seventy-eight men in vehicles and conducted the patrol about fourteen
miles northeast of Hadong without encountering the enemy. In the afternoon
Barszcz returned to the main Hadong-Chinju road near the village of Sigum,
about twelve miles east of Hadong.
While he stopped there, an officer with about fifty men came down the
road from the direction of Hadong. They told him they were all that were
left of L Company. Most of the men were without clothing except for their
shorts and boots. One M1 rifle, which apparently had not been fired, and
a .45-caliber pistol were their only weapons. The L Company group explained
their condition by saying they had to swim a river and wade through rice
paddies. Barszcz relieved the group of the weapons, put the men on two
trucks, and sent them down the road to Chinju.
Expecting more American stragglers from Hadong, Barszcz put G Company
astride the road in a defensive position to cover their withdrawal. He
had sent a message with the Chinju-bound trucks explaining what he had
done and asked for further orders. 
Barszcz held his roadblock east of Hadong until 0400 the morning of
28 July, when Captain Montesclaros from the staff of 2d Battalion, 19th
Infantry, arrived with orders and trucks to take G Company back to a line
of hills just west of the Nam River, about four miles from Chinju. 
At first, Colonel Moore had thought that the Hadong fight was going
well. Major Raibl arrived at Chinju with the first wounded in the early
afternoon of 27 July, and reported that the 3d Battalion was fighting well
and that he thought it would win the battle. But, when other survivors
came in later, the real outcome of the engagement became clear. News of
the disaster at Hadong reached higher headquarters with unexpected and
startling impact. A message from Major Logan, 19th Infantry, to General
Church that night reporting on the condition of the 3d Battalion, 19th
Infantry, said, "No estimate on total number of casualties. Over 100
WIA now in aid station"  A count the next day of the assembled
3d Battalion showed there were 354 officers and men, including some walking
wounded, able for duty. When all the stragglers had come in, casualties
were listed as 2 killed, 52 wounded, and 349 missing. An enemy soldier
captured later said the North Koreans took approximately 100 American prisoners
at Hadong. When American forces rewon the Hadong area in late September
a search uncovered 313 American bodies, most of them along the river and
in the rice paddies. 
The loss of key officers in the battalion was severe. It included the
battalion executive officer, the S-1 the S-2, and the Assistant S-3. The
company commanders of Headquarters, I, K, and M Companies were lost, Donahue
of K and Capt. Hugh P. Milleson of M were killed, Makarounis of I was captured.
(He escaped from the North Koreans in October near P'yongyang.) Approximately
thirty vehicles and practically all the crew-served weapons, communication
equipment, and even most of the individual weapons were lost. 
On 28 July, the day after Hadong, the 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, was
reorganized, all remaining personnel being grouped in K and L Companies.
The next day, K Company was attached to the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry,
at Chinju, and L Company to the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, two miles
to the south of Chinju. 
The N.K. 4th Divisions Joins the Enveloping Move
After the fall of Taejon, the N.K. 4th Division rested
in the city for two days and took in 1,000 untrained replacements. On the
morning of 23 July, it started south from Taejon on the Kumsan road. It
was joining the 6th Division in an envelopment of the United
Nations' left flank. The N.K. 6th Division moved on
an outer arc around the left of the U.N. position, the N.K. 4th
Division on an inner arc. The two divisions were engaging in a co-ordinated
movement on a theater scale.  (See Map III.)
At Kumsan the 4th Division received another 1,000 replacements
that had trained only a few days. Departing Kumsan on or about 25 July,
the division reportedly left behind the tank regiment that had accompanied
it ever since they had crossed the 38th Parallel together a month earlier.
The tanks were to remain in Kumsan until the division had crossed the Naktong.
On 28 July the first indication appeared in American intelligence estimates
that elements of the N.K. 6th Division might have moved south.
The next day the Eighth Army intelligence section conjectured that the
enemy had shifted troops southward. It stated that major parts of one enemy
division probably were in the Chinju area and major elements of another
in the Koch'ang area. While the estimate did not identify the enemy unit
in the Koch'ang area, it erroneously repeated that "all elements of
this division [the 4th] are attacking eastward along the axis Chinju-Masan."
 Even after the Hadong battle on the 27th, Eighth Army did not know
that these troops were from the 6th Division.
The 34th Infantry of the 24th Division, defending the Koch'ang approach
to the Naktong, had a regimental strength at this time of about 1,150 men,
with the 1st and 3d Battalions averaging approximately 350 men each. It
was in position at Koch'ang on 27 July.
Koch'ang is about midway on the main road between Kumch'on and Chinju
and is strategically located near the point where two lateral east-west
roads, one from Namwon and Hamyang and the other from Chinan, cross the
Kumch'on-Chinju road and continue eastward through Hyopch'on and Ch'ogye
to the Naktong River. Chinju is thirty-five air miles south of Koch'ang.
On 27 July, Colonel Moore sent Colonel Wilson with the 1st Battalion,
19th Infantry, north from Chinju to relieve Colonel Rhea in the Anui area.
Colonel Rhea was then to bring his battalion south to Chinju, where Colonel
Moore planned to concentrate the 19th Infantry.
The relief took place at Umyong-ni in the early afternoon of 27 July.
Wilson's battalion had no artillery, armor, or air support. A platoon of
4.2 mortars had only two rounds of white phosphorous shells for ammunition.
Mounted messengers traveling over thirty-five miles of road were the only
means of communication between Wilson and Colonel Moore's command post.
In the early afternoon, Colonel Rhea guided 1st Lt. John C. Hughes with B Company, 19th Infantry, reinforced
by approximately thirty-five men and their weapons from the Heavy Weapons
Company, from Umyong-ni to relieve A Company, 19th Infantry, at Anui. A
Company was engaged in a small arms fight and its relief could not be accomplished
at once. Colonel Rhea returned to Umyong-ni, leaving instructions that
the company should follow him as soon as possible, which he expected would
be shortly. At Umyong-ni Rhea waited about five hours for A Company. Then,
when reconnaissance toward Anui showed that an enemy force had cut the
road, he started just before dusk with the rest of the battalion for Chinju
as ordered. 
Meanwhile, Colonel Wilson had sent 2d Lt. Frank Iwanczyk, Assistant
S-3, with two jeeps from Umyong-ni to make contact with the 34th Infantry
at Koch'ang; 1st Lt. Sam C. Holliday, S-2, went to make contact with the
ROK troops at Hamyang.
Iwanczyk set off northward. At the Anui crossroads he checked his map
and then led off toward Koch'ang, waving the other jeep to follow. Because
of the heavy dust the second jeep kept well behind the first.
A mile north of the crossroads, an enemy machine gun, hidden in a native
hut on a turn of the road, suddenly poured devastating fire into the lead
jeep. The bodies of all four men fell from the wrecked vehicle into a rice
field. The second jeep stopped with a jerk and the men jumped into the
ditch by the road. After three or four minutes of silence, seven or eight
North Korean soldiers started down the road. They passed the first jeep
and, when nearing the second, they shouted and started to run toward it.
Pvt. Sidney D. Talley stood up and fired his M1 at the North Koreans. He
killed two of them. His three companions now joined in firing. The surviving
North Koreans turned and ran back.
One of the Americans scrambled up the bank, turned the jeep around,
the others jumped in, and the driver raced back to the Anui crossroads.
There, they excitedly told members of B Company about the roadblock. At
the battalion command post they repeated their story. 
By this time, Lieutenant Holliday had returned from Hamyang. There he
had found somewhat less than 600 men of the ROK 7th Division and 150 fresh
South Korean marines from Mokp'o. Holliday with three men now set off for
Anui. Two and a half miles short of the town, enemy fire from a roadblock
destroyed their jeep and wounded one man in the chest. Holliday covered
the withdrawal of his three men with BAR fire, and then followed them.
Relieved finally at Anui about 1600, A Company, 19th Infantry, loaded
into trucks and started south to join Rhea's battalion. A mile below the
town the company ran into a fire fight between North and South Korean troops
and was stopped. After enemy fire wrecked six of its vehicles, the company
destroyed the others, abandoned its heavy equipment, and started on foot
through the hills toward the 34th Infantry positions at Koch'ang. The next
morning 64 American and 60 ROK soldiers came in to Colonel Beauchamp's positions there.
Why this force did not return to Anui and join Lieutenant Hughes is not
Meanwhile at Anui, Lieutenant Hughes' B Company, 28th Infantry, was
under attack from superior numbers closing in from three sides, and by
nightfall it had been forced back into the town. Hughes made plans to withdraw
across the upper Nam River to a high hill east of the town. Two officers
and sixteen men got across before enemy automatic fire cut off the rest.
After vainly trying to help the rest of the company to break out eastward,
the eighteen men went over the hills to the 34th Infantry position at Koch'ang.
In Anui the cutoff troops engaged in street fighting until midnight. Those
who escaped walked out through the hills during the next several days.
Approximately half of the 215 men of B and D Companies, 29th Infantry,
taking part in the Anui battle, were either killed or listed as missing
in action. 
Colonel Wilson and the rest of the battalion at Umyong-ni meanwhile
knew nothing of the fate of B Company at Anui except that enemy forces
had engaged it, and that roadblocks were above and below it. Wilson made
two unsuccessful attempts to send help to B Company.
The enemy troops that had closed on Anui were advanced units of the
N.K. 4th Division. They were well aware that a mixed force
of American and South Korean troops was only a few miles below them. To
deal with this force, elements of the division turned south from Anui early
on 28 July.
In defensive positions about Umyong-ni and Hamyang, Colonel Wilson's
men were on the east side of the Nam River. Col. Min Ki Sik's remnants
of the ROK 7th Division and a small force of South Korean marines were
on the west side. American mortar fire turned back the small enemy force
that approached Umyong-ni. On the west side of the river near Hamyang a
hard fight developed. There, the South Koreans seemed about to lose the
battle until their reserve marines fought through to the enemy's flank.
This caused the North Koreans to withdraw northward. From prisoners captured
in this battle Wilson learned of the American defeat at Anui the day before.
Learning that evening that the enemy was moving around his battalion
on back trails in the direction of Chinju, Colonel Wilson began, after
dark, the first of a series of withdrawals. On 30 July the battalion reached
the vicinity of Sanch'ong, twenty miles north of Chinju, and went into
defensive positions there on orders from Colonel Moore. Colonel Min's ROK
troops also withdrew southward, passed through Wilson's positions, and
continued on into Chinju. 
The N.K. 4th Division seizes the Koch'ang Approach to the Naktong
Having brushed aside the American and ROK force at Anui, in what it
called a "small engagement," the N.K. 4th Division
turned northeast toward Koch'ang. A patrol from the 34th Infantry on 27
July had, from a distance, seen and heard the fighting in progress at Anui.
Its report alerted Colonel Beauchamp to the possibility of an early attack.
Colonel Beauchamp had disposed the 34th Infantry in a three-quarter
circle around Koch'ang, which lay in the middle of a two-and-a-half-mile-wide
oval-shaped basin in a north-south mountain valley. The 3d Battalion was
on high ground astride the Anui road two miles west of the town, the 71st
Battalion about the same distance east of it on the Hyopch'on road, a reinforced
platoon of I Company at a roadblock across the Kumch'on road four miles
north of the town, while the Heavy Mortar Company was at its northern edge.
Artillery support consisted of A Battery, 13th Field Artillery Battalion,
which had five 105-mm. howitzers in position two miles southeast of the
The 34th Infantry, not having been able to re-equip since Taejon, did
not have a regimental switchboard. There were only a few radios. The regiment
was short of mortars, bazookas, and machine guns. Some of the men did not
have complete uniforms, many had no helmets, most did not have entrenching
tools. Every man, however, did have his individual weapon.
Before dusk of 28 July, forward observers could see a long line of enemy
traffic piled up behind a roadblock that the 34th Infantry had constructed
at a defile on the Anui road west of the town. They directed artillery
fire on this column until darkness fell.  Colonel Beauchamp then brought
his two infantry battalions closer to Koch'ang for a tighter defense.
About dark, Beauchamp received orders to report to the 24th Division
command post at Hyopch'on. There he told General Church of an anticipated
enemy attack and of his plan to withdraw the 3d Battalion to a previously
selected position three miles southeast of Koch'ang. General Church did
not agree and told Beauchamp to hold the town.  Beauchamp thereupon
telephoned his executive officer and told him to stop the withdrawal of
the 3d Battalion. When Beauchamp returned to Koch'ang at 0300 everything
In darkness an hour later (about 0400 29 July), a North Korean attack
came from two directions. One force, striking from the north, cut off I
Company. Another moved around the town on the north and then struck southward
across the road east of Koch'ang. The 1st Battalion repulsed this attack,
but then, without orders, fell back toward the secondary position three
miles east of Koch'ang. Colonel Beauchamp met the battalion on the road and stopped
Before daylight the 3d Battalion, also without orders, fell back through
Koch'ang, leaving I Company isolated to the north. This battalion ran a
gantlet of enemy automatic and small arms fire for a mile, but in the protecting
darkness suffered few casualties. After daylight the 1st Battalion rescued
all but one platoon of I Company. The men of this platoon were either killed
or captured. 
During the pre-dawn attack some small arms fire struck in the howitzer
positions of A Battery, 13th Field Artillery Battalion, from a ridge 500
yards eastward. Maj. Leon B. Cheek, the battalion executive officer, awoke
to the sound of the firing. Hurrying to the road he saw the battery commander,
who said the enemy had overrun the artillery. The battery executive officer
came up and told Cheek that everyone had "taken off," although
he had ordered the men to their foxholes. When the firing began, he said,
someone yelled, "Run for your life!" Two squads of infantry attached
to the artillery to provide security had joined the stampede. 
Cheek stopped the wild shooting in his vicinity and started toward the
howitzers. He ordered all prime movers driven back to the gun positions.
Twelve men from the artillery and the drivers of the prime movers obeyed.
From the infantry, a BAR man and three riflemen volunteered to go forward
to cover the artillerymen while they pulled out the howitzers. Cheek placed
these four men in firing positions and they soon almost silenced the enemy.
A small enemy patrol of six or seven men apparently had caused the debacle.
Cheek and the twelve artillerymen loaded the equipment and ammunition,
hitched the prime movers to the guns, and, one by one, pulled the five
howitzers to the road. They then withdrew eastward.
During 29 July the 34th Infantry Regiment withdrew eastward 15 miles
to hill positions near Sanje-ri on the road to Hyopch'on. From a point
3 miles south east of Koch'ang the road for the next 10 miles is virtually
a defile. The with drawing 34th Infantry and its engineer troops blew all
the bridges and at many points set off demolition charges in the cliffs
overhanging the road. The 18th Regiment of the enemy division
pressed on after the retreating 34th Infantry. The N.K. 4th Division
left its artillery behind at Koch'ang because of the destroyed bridges
ahead of it. In advancing to the Naktong River on the Hyopch'on road, it
employed only small arms and mortar fire.  It was anticipated that
the enemy force which had captured Koch'ang would soon approach the Naktong
River for a crossing below Taegu. This prospect created another difficulty
for Eighth Army. To meet it, General Walker told General Church he would
send to him the ROK 17th Regiment, one of the best South Korean units at
that time. He also shifted the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, from
the P'ohang-dong Yongdok area on the east coast to Hyopch'on, where it took up defensive
positions back of the 34th Infantry west of the town. The ROK 17th Regiment,
2,000 strong, arrived at the 34th Infantry position in the dead of night
at 0200 30 July. It went at once into positions on the high ground on either
Only after the Koch'ang action did Eighth Army finally, on 31 July,
identify the enemy unit in this area as the 4th Division.
This led it to conclude in turn that the enemy force in the Chinju area
was the 6th Division. Eighth Army then decided that the enemy
effort against the United Nations' left flank was in reality being carried
out by two widely separated forces: the N.K. 4th Division
from the Anui-Koch'ang area, to envelop the main battle positions on Eighth
Army's left flank, and the N.K. 6th Division from the Chinju
area, to cut lines of communication in the rear, drive through Masan, and
capture the port of Pusan. 
Chinju Falls to the Enemy - 31 July
On 28 July, Colonel Rhea arrived at Chinju from Anui with the 1st Battalion,
19th Infantry, less A Company. He passed through the town with orders to
take up blocking positions ten miles south. Rhea proceeded to the vicinity
of Kuho-ri, about two miles west of the Sach'on Airfield. There his battalion
of only 200 riflemen went into position to block a secondary road approach
to Chinju along the coast from Hadong.  Colonel McGrail's 2d Battalion,
19th Infantry, that same morning occupied defensive positions on high ground
astride the Chinju-Hadong road just west of the Nam River. Remnants of
the 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, that had escaped from the Hadong fight
and numerous ROK troops were in and around Chinju.
Aerial reconnaissance during that day and the next showed heavy enemy
traffic entering Hadong from all roads and noted movement northeast on
the Chinju road. American intelligence estimated that two enemy regiments
with tanks were in the Hadong area. 
Before noon, 29 July, an enemy column with three motorcycles in the
lead approached the 2d Battalion's advanced blocking position about six
miles southwest of Chinju. Although there was an automatic weapon available,
it did not fire on the column. The few rounds of artillery that fell were
inaccurate and ineffective. The advanced unit, F Company, then withdrew
to join the main battalion position just west of the Nam River four miles
from Chinju. An air strike on the enemy column reportedly inflicted considerable
damage, halting it temporarily. 
Early the next morning an enemy unit moved around the right flank (north)
of the 2d Battalion and cut the road running northwest out of Chinju to
the 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry.
Captain Barszcz, from G Company's position across the Nam River west of Chinju, saw and reported at least
800 enemy troops moving across his front Small arms fire did not disperse
them. He called for an aerial observer, but the observer overhead reported
he saw no enemy. The reason was clear: the North Koreans were all wearing
foliage camouflage and they squatted quietly on the ground while the plane
was overhead. Captain Barszcz directed artillery fire on the column, but
after about twenty rounds the artillery stopped firing because of ammunition
shortage. Rain and low overcasts during the day hampered efforts of aerial
reconnaissance to report on enemy movements. 
That afternoon, 30 July, E and F Companies of the 19th Infantry fell
back across the Nam River to the hills two miles west of Chinju. Just before
evening, G Company crossed the river from its isolated position. Once on
the east side it took up a defensive position in the flat ground near the
river bank, with the mission of preventing enemy infiltration into Chinju
between the road and the river. The hill positions of the rest of the battalion
were beyond the road to its right (north). There was no physical contact
between G Company and these troops. 
The 19th Infantry faced the critical test of the defense of Chinju pitifully
understrength. Its unit report for 30 July gives the regiment a strength
of 1,895, with 300 men in the 1st Battalion and 290 men in the 2d Battalion
Colonel Moore, however, states that the strength of the 19th Infantry on
30 July, including the replacements that arrived that afternoon, was 1,544
The 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, still disorganized as a result of the
Hadong battle, had a reported strength that day of 396 men. On 30 July,
all ROK forces in the Chinju area came under Colonel Moore's command, including
the remnants of the 7th Division, now known as Task Force Min, which during
the day arrived at Chinju from the Hamyang area with 1,249 men. 
Several hundred replacements arrived at Chinju for the 19th Infantry
at this time-175 on 28 July and 600 on 30 July-but it is doubtful if they
contributed much to the combat effectiveness of the regiment in the Chinju
battle. Of the 600 that arrived on 30 July, 500 went to the 19th Infantry
and most of the remainder to the 13th Field Artillery Battalion. About
1600 these replacements started forward from the regimental command post
in Chinju for distribution by the battalions to the rifle companies that
evening. Although the rifle companies were then engaged with the enemy,
Colonel Moore decided that they needed replacements at the front to help
in the fighting, and that it would be best to send them forward at once
rather than to wait for an opportunity to integrate them into the units
during a lull in the battle. 
The 1st Battalion received about 150 of the replacements just before
dark and Colonel Rhea immediately assigned them to companies. Some died
without ever appearing on the company rosters. The 2d Battalion received
an approximately equal number of replacements, and they, too, reached the
rifle companies about dusk. Of the sixty replacements assigned to G Company,
four or five became casualties before they reached the company position.
Captain Barszcz had pleaded in vain with the battalion executive against
sending replacements to him in the midst of action. He believed that they
not only would be a burden to him but that many of them would be casualties.
In the battle that night both fears became reality. 
After dark the enemy moved in for close-quarter attack. Before midnight,
G Company killed several North Korean soldiers inside its perimeter. Out
of communication with battalion headquarters, and with friendly artillery
fire falling near, Barszcz tried to join the other rifle companies on his
right, but he found North Koreans on the road in strength and had to move
around them. About midnight he crossed the road to the north side. There
he and his men lay hidden in bushes for two or three hours. During this
time several enemy tanks loaded with infantry passed along the road headed
in the direction of Chinju. 
The North Koreans directed their main attack against E and F Companies
in front of Chinju. This began about 0215, 31 July, with artillery barrages.
Forty-five minutes later whistles signaled the infantry attack and enemy
soldiers closed in, delivering small arms fire. The main effort was against
F Company on the hill overlooking the river. There a crisis developed about
Back of the F Company hill, members of the Heavy Weapons Company watched
the battle as it developed in front of them. One of the youngsters in H
Company said, "Here comes the cavalry just like in the movies,"
as a platoon of F Company came off the hill followed by North Koreans.
Other members of F Company ran toward E Company's position. At least one
platoon of the Heavy Weapons Company opened fire on the intermingled American
and North Korean soldiers. Within a few minutes, however, this platoon
withdrew toward Chinju. At the edge of the town, Colonel McGrail met H
Company and put it in a defensive position around the battalion command
post. The organized parts of E and F Companies also fell back on Chinju
about daylight. 
While this battle was in progress, Captain Barszcz received radio orders
to move to Chinju. He took his company north over high ground and then
circled eastward. On the way he picked up stragglers and wounded men from
E, F, and H Companies, 19th Infantry, and K Company, 19th Infantry. By
daylight his group was two or three miles northeast of Chinju. Around noon,
Barszcz joined Colonel Moore and elements of the 19th Infantry east of the town. During the night, G Company had suffered
about 40 casualties, but of this number it brought approximately 20 wounded
through the hills with it-10 were litter cases. 
The 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, also had come under attack during
the night. It held a strong defensive position below the Nam River on high
ground four miles south of Chinju, overlooking the Sach'on-Chinju road
near its juncture with the road east to Masan.
Colonel Rhea and his men at dusk on 30 July could clearly see North
Koreans out in the open going into position, but they were forbidden to
fire because a ROK Marine battalion attack was scheduled to sweep across
in front of them. But the ROK's never entered the fight there, and the
enemy used this three-to-four-hour period unmolested for maneuvering against
the 1st Battalion. 
That night, enemy mortars and self-propelled weapons supported efforts
of the N.K. 15th Regiment to infiltrate the 1st Battalion's
position. But it was on terrain hard to attack, and the enemy effort failed.
The North Koreans in front of the 1st Battalion withdrew before dawn, apparently
veering off to the northwest.
After daylight, 31 July, Colonel Rhea, on orders from Colonel Moore,
began moving his battalion ten miles eastward on the Masan road to occupy
a defensive position at the Chinju pass. The 1st Battalion withdrew to
this position without enemy contact and went into defensive perimeter there
astride the road before nightfall. 
Within Chinju itself, Colonel Moore, shortly after daybreak, prepared
to evacuate the town. By 0600 enemy small arms fire was striking in its
western edge, and six North Korean armored vehicles, which Colonel Moore
believed to be three tanks and three self-propelled guns, were in Chinju
firing at American targets. At 0640 Moore ordered heavy equipment withdrawn
from the town. Fifty minutes later the 13th Field Artillery Battalion (less
A Battery) and B Battery, 11th Field Artillery Battalion, started to displace
and move eastward. Enemy mortar, machine gun, and small arms fire fell
in Chinju during the withdrawal. Enemy snipers were also inside the town.
By 0745, 31 July, Maj. Jack R. Emery, regimental S-4, had dispatched
eastward out of Chinju the last of five trains totaling twenty-five cars
evacuating the 19th Infantry supplies. Colonel Moore and his command post
stayed in Chinju until about 0800.
The withdrawal from Chinju was relatively orderly, although slow and
laborious, with refugees, animal-drawn wagons, and American and ROK foot
soldiers intermingled in the streets. There was some tendency to panic,
however, and Colonel Moore himself had occasion to stop some cars that started to "take off" east of Chinju.
The main highway bridge over the Nam at the southern edge of Chinju
was under enemy fire and considered unusable. In the withdrawal, therefore,
the 2d Battalion followed the road north of the Nam to Uiryong, where it
assembled on the evening of 31 July. The regimental command post moved
eastward out of Chinju, crossed the Nam about 3 miles northeast of the
town, and then went east on the Masan road to Chiryong-ni, a small village
12 air miles east of Chinju and 1 mile beyond the Much'on-ni-Masan road
fork. The artillery, accompanied by the 3d Battalion, 29th Infantry, withdrew
from Chinju north of the Nam River, crossing to the south side at Uiryong,
and went into an assembly area at Komam-ni (Saga) shortly after noon. There
it received an airdrop message from General Church ordering it to return
to the vicinity of Chinju. During the afternoon the five 105-mm. howitzers
of B Battery, 13th Field Artillery Battalion, and the eight 155-mm. howitzers
of B Battery, 11th Field Artillery Battalion, rolled west and went into
position at the Chinju pass in support of Colonel Rhea's 1st Battalion,
19th Infantry. 
The 19th Infantry estimated enemy strength in the Chinju area, when
the city fell on the morning of 31 July, as 2,000 troops, with an unknown
number of tanks and artillery pieces. American aerial strikes on Chinju
during the day left it in flames. Late that night a Korean source sent
a message that 4,000 enemy troops were in Chinju setting up communications
and weapons. 
A ROK Army source reported that North Koreans had secured Chinju at
0900, 31 July. This may very well have been true for the main part of the
town north of the Nam River, but it was not true for that part south of
the Nam, where 1st Lt. Samuel R. Fowler and fourteen enlisted men still
stayed by three M26 Pershing medium tanks.
Three Pershing Tanks at Chinju
One little drama was enacted in Chinju on 31 July after the 19th Infantry
withdrew from the town that should be told. It is the story of the first
three medium tanks in Korea and their brave commander. On 28 June, the
fourth day of the war, Col. Olaf P. Winningstad, Eighth Army Ordnance chief,
found three M26 Pershing medium tanks at the Tokyo Ordnance Depot in bad
condition and needing extensive repairs, including rebuilt engines. The
repair work began at once and was completed on 13 July. The three tanks
were shipped to Pusan where they arrived on 16 July, the first American
medium tanks in Korea. With them were Lieutenant Fowler and fourteen enlisted
crew members. Trained to operate M24 light tanks, they were now expected
to become familiar with the Pershing tank.
The tanks gave trouble because of improper fan belts that would stretch
and permit the motors to overheat. Belts made in Japan were either too
short or too long despite emergency orders for corrections in them. 
Eighth Army hoped to use these tanks to help stop the North Korean drive
in the southwest. It sent them by rail to Chinju where they arrived at
0300, 28 July. They were unloaded at the Rail Transportation Office on
the south side of the Nam River where the rail line terminated. There they
awaited new belts. When the N.K. 6th Division entered Chinju on
the morning of 31 July, these tanks took no part in the battle.
Flatcars from Pusan to evacuate the tanks passed through Masan the morning
of 31 July but never got beyond Chungam-ni, about twenty-five miles short
of Chinju. Snarled rail traffic caused by evacuation of the 19th Infantry
supplies blocked the way.
At daybreak, Lieutenant Fowler went to Colonel Moore for instructions.
Moore told him that if the enemy overran the 19th Infantry positions on
the northwest side of Chinju and he could not evacuate the tanks under
their own power, he was to destroy them and evacuate his tank crews by
truck. Lieutenant Fowler telephoned Masan and apparently learned that the
flatcars had departed there for Chinju to get the tanks. He decided to
Gradually the firing in Chinju died down. A ROK soldier who passed the
rail station about noon told Fowler that only a very few ROK soldiers were
still in the town.
A little later, William R. Moore, an Associated Press correspondent,
suddenly appeared and suggested to Fowler that he should check a body of
men coming up the rail track. It was now perhaps an hour past noon. Fowler
had an interpreter call to the approaching men. They were North Koreans.
Fowler ordered his tank crews to open fire. In the fire fight that immediately
flared between the tank .30- and .50-caliber machine guns and the enemy
small arms fire, Fowler received a bullet in his left side. In this close-range
fight the tank machine gun fire killed or wounded most of the enemy group,
which was about platoon size. The tankers put Fowler into his tank and
started the three tanks east on the road to Masan.
Two miles down the road the tanks came to a blown bridge. The men prepared
to abandon the tanks and proceed on foot. They removed Fowler from his
tank and made a litter for him. Fowler ordered the men to destroy the tanks
by dropping grenades into them. Three men started for the tanks to do this.
At this moment an enemy force lying in ambush opened fire. A number of
men got under the bridge with Fowler. MSgt. Bryant E. W. Shrader was the
only man on the tanks. He opened fire with the .50-caliber machine gun.
A North Korean called out in English for the men to surrender.
Shrader left the machine gun, started the tank, and drove it close to
one of the other tanks. He dropped the escape hatch and took in six men.
He then drove back toward Chinju and stopped the tank a few feet short
of the bridge over the Nam, undecided whether to cross to the other side.
There the overheated engine stopped and would not start again. The seven
men abandoned the tank and ran into the bamboo thickets fringing the river. After many close calls with enemy forces Shrader and his group
finally reached safety and passed through the lines of the 25th Division
west of Masan. 
The men back at the blown bridge had no chance. Some were killed or
wounded at the first fire. Others were killed or wounded under the bridge.
A few ran into nearby fields trying to escape but were killed or captured.
One of those captured said later he saw several bodies floating in the
stream and recognized two as Fowler and Moore. 
Colonel Wilson Escapes With the 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry
On the morning of 31 July, the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, was at
Sanch'ong. It was unaware that Chinju, twenty air miles to the southeast,
had fallen and that the 19th Infantry Regiment had withdrawn eastward.
The mess trucks that went to Chinju the day before from the battalion
had not returned. During the morning local villagers suddenly disappeared,
a sure sign that enemy forces were approaching. Colonel Wilson drove south
to Tansong, ten air miles from Chinju, where he had a roadblock. While
he talked with Lieutenant Griffin, who was in command of a platoon there,
about 700 refugees streamed through the roadblock. All agreed that enemy
troops were behind them. 
Colonel Wilson now decided to send the battalion's heavy vehicles out
eastward before the roads were cut. His executive officer, Maj. Charles
E. Arnold, brought the vehicular convoy to Tansong and there it turned
east over a trail through the mountains in the direction of Uiryong. The
trail was passable only to jeeps. But by the labors of his own men and
all the Koreans he could assemble, Arnold improved it to the extent that
all vehicles got through and reached Chungam-ni, except one that broke
through an improvised bridge and was abandoned.
At 1700, Colonel Wilson and the battalion troops started withdrawing
southward from Sanch'ong. They had marched about an hour when a liaison
plane flew over the column and dropped a message. Opening it, Colonel Wilson
was astonished to read, "Yesterday you were ordered to report to the
concentration area of Haman. What are you doing here?" Haman was thirty-five
miles away as the crow flies and much farther by the roads and mountain
Wilson led his battalion on down to Tansong. There, a South Korean naval
lieutenant detached himself from a group of refugees and came over to Wilson
with a map. He said he had been at Chinju and that the American troops
had left there, retreating eastward. He continued, "The Reds are just
seven miles behind us and will get here tonight." Wilson talked to
him at length and became convinced that his story was reliable. After consulting
some of the battalion staff, Wilson decided to leave the Chinju road and
head for Haman across the mountains.
The men discarded all personal effects. Three or four sick and injuredsoldiers rode in the few jeeps, which also carried the radios, mortars,
and machine guns. The battalion late in the evening headed east over the
Uiryong trail. At 0200 the men reached Masang-ni, where the last north-south
road that the enemy from the Chinju area could use to cut them off intersected
the lateral trail they were following. Once east of this crossroad point,
Wilson halted the battalion and, after security guards were posted, the
men lay down to rest. During their night march, many refugees had joined
At 0600 the next morning, 1 August, the battalion took up the march
eastward. It forded a stream and, half a mile beyond, the footsore men
came on a gladsome sight: Major Arnold awaited them with a convoy of the
battalion's trucks that he had led out the day before. 
On the last day of July the North Koreans could look back on a spectacular
triumph in their enveloping maneuver through southwest Korea. Chinju had
fallen. Their troops were ready to march on Masan and, once past that place,
to drive directly on Pusan.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 100 (N.K. 6th Div), pp. 33-35;
GHQ FEC Sitrep, 20 Jul 50.
 EUSAK WD, Briefing for CG and G-3 Sec, 20 Jul 50.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 100 (N.K 6th Div), p. 36. The
dates given in the enemy interrogations are often erroneous by one to
several days, dependent as they are on human memory. They always have to
be checked against U.S. records.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 100 (N.K. 6th Div), p. 37.
 Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 2, pp. 86-89, Notebook, Itinerary of
Guerrilla Band, 4 Jul-3 Aug 50.
 Telecons, Tokyo to Washington, TT 3559, 21 Jul 50, and TT 3563, 22
 Telephone interv, author with Lt Col James C. Tarkenton, Jr. (Eighth
Army G-2 in 1950), 3 Oct 52. Colonel Tarkenton said that at this time he
used two L-4 planes to fly daily reconnaissance to the west coast below
the Kum River. Information also came from aerial combat missions.
 EUSAK WD, G-g Sec, 23 Jul 50; Landrum, Notes for author, n.d., but
received 8 Mar 54: New York Times, July 23, 1950; USAF Hist Study 71,
pp. 15-16, 20.
 EUSAK WD, G-2 Stf Rpt, 23 Jul 50; Interv, author with Tarkenton, 3
 EUSAK WD, G-3 Sec, 24 Jul 50.
 Interv, author with Lt Col Paul F. Smith, 1 Oct 52; Landrum, Notes
for author, recd 8 Mar 54.
 Interv, author with Church, 25 Sep 52.
 EUSAK WD, Summ, 12-31 Jul 50; 24th Div Go 52, 23 Jul 50; 24th Div
WD, G-4 Hist Rpt, 23 Jul-25 Aug 50, p. 16.
At one point in his career, General Church had commanded the 157th
Regiment at Anzio in World War II.
 24th Div WD, Jul 50, 25-26 Jul; Ibid., G-2 Jnl, entries 53, 241440
Jul 50, and 104, 251700 Jul 50; EUSAK WD POR 36, 24 Jul 50.
 EUSAK PIR 13, 25 Jul 50; Ibid., G-3 Jnl, 25 Jul 50; 24th Div WD,
G-2 Jnl, entry 81, 250215, entry 1513, 251700, and entry 1491, 250330
Jul 50; Telecon, Tokyo to Washington, TT 3567, 24 Jul 50.
 Ltr, Col Robert L. Rhea to author, 21 Sep 53; Moore, Notes for
author, Jul 53; 24th Div WD, 25-26 Jul 50.
 Interv, author with Beauchamp, 24 Sep 52; 24th Div WD, 26 Jul 50.
 Interv, author with Raibl, 7 Oct 53; Raibl, 10-page typescript
statement prepared for author, 19 Oct 53, on events leading up to and
participation of 3d Bn, 19th Inf, in action at Hadong; Ltr, Capt James
E. Townes (S-4, 3d Bn, 28th Inf, Jul 50) to author, 8 Oct 53.
 Raibl, Statement for author, 19 Oct 53 Interv, author with Lt Col
Charles E. Arnold (Ex Off, 1st Bn, 19th Inf, Jul 50), 21 Jul 51; Capt
Sam C. Holliday, Notes prepared for author, 31 Mar 53, on 1st Bn, 29th
Inf, 21 Jul-4 Aug 50 (Holliday was S-2, 1st Bn, in Jul 50); Ltr, Gen
Wright to author, 9 Mar 54; 3d Bn, 27th Inf, Hist Rpt, 24 Jul-31 Aug 50
(3d Bn, 19th Inf, in Jul 50).
 EUSAK WD, POR 36, 24 Jul 50; Ibid., G-4 Sec, 24 Jul 50.
 Raibl Statement, 19 Oct 53; Interv, author with Raibl, 7 Oct 53;
Interv, author with Maj George F. Sharra (CO L Co, 29th Inf, Jul 50), 20
Oct 53; Interv, author with Col Moore, 20 Aug 52.
 Raibl Statement, 19 Oct 53; Intervs, author with Raibl, 7 Oct 53,
and Sharra, 20 Oct 53.
 Raibl Statement, 19 Oct 53; Interv, author with Maj Robert M.
Flynn, 5 Nov 53 (Flynn was S-3, 3d Bn, 28th Inf, in Jul 50); 25th Div
WD, 3d Bn, 27th Inf, Hist Rpt, 24 Jul-31 Aug 50.
 Raibl statement, 19 Oct 53: Intervs, author with Raibl, 7 Oct 53,
Sharra, 20 Oct 53, and Flynn, 5 Nov 53; Interv, author with Capt Kenneth
W. Hughes (who commanded the advanced mortar platoon at Hadong), 21 Jul
51. All these men saw the incident described and agree on the
 Intervs, author with Raibl, 7 Oct 53, Flynn, 5 Nov 53, and Sharra,
20 Oct 53.
 Interv, author with Flynn, 5 Nov 53.
 13th FA Bn WD, 27 Jul 50.
 New York Times, July 29, 1950, R. J. H. Johnston dispatch.
 Ltrs, Capt Michael Barszcz to author, 30 Jul and 21 Aug 52; Interv,
Blumenson with Herbert (Plat Ldr, 1st Plat, G Co, 19th Inf, in Jul 50),
31 Jul 51, in OCMH files as Chinju Action.
 Ltrs, Barszcz to author, 30 Jul and 21 Aug 52; Intervs, author with
McGrail and Montesclaros, 20 Aug 52.
 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, entry 159, 27 Jul 50.
 24th Div G-3 Jnl, entry, 1583, 272210 Jul 50; EUSAK WD, Br for CG,
27 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, entry 206, 281245 Jul 50; 25th Div WD,
3d Bn, 27th Inf, Hist Rpt, 24 Jul-31 Aug 50; Ltr, Townes to author, 8
Oct 53; 25th Div WD, Aug 50, 35th Inf Interrog PW's (Ko Hei Yo). Major
Sharra gave the author the figure of 313 American dead.
 25th Div WD, 3d Bn, 27th Inf Hist Rpt, 24 Jul-31 Aug 50.
 24th Div WD, 30 Jul 50.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 100 (N.K. 6th Div), pp. 35-37;
Ibid., Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div), pp. 46-47.
 Ibid., Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div), p. 47.
 EUSAK WD, G-2 Stf Sec Rpt, 29 Jul 50.
 Holliday, Notes for author, 31 Mar 53.
 Ltrs, Col Rhea to author, 9 Apr and 21 Sep 53.
 Holliday, Notes for author, 31 Mar 53.
 Holliday, Notes for author, 31 Mar 53; 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, entry
159, 27 Jul, and entries 217 at 281120 and 219 at 281407 Jul 50; Ibid.,
G-2 Jnl, entry 1570, 27 Jul, and entries 1614 and 1621, 28 Jul 50; 24th
Div WD, 29 Jul 50.
 Holliday, Notes for author, 31 Mar 53, The account of B Company
action at Anui is based largely on information supplied by Lieutenant
Hughes in the Notes.
 Holliday, Notes for author, 31 Mar 53.
 Ibid. The author has been unable to find the 1st Battalion, 29th
Infantry, records for July 1950.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div), p. 47;
Interv, author with Beauchamp, 24 Sep 52.
 Ibid.; 24th Div WD, 28 Jul 50; Ibid., G-3 Jnl, 23-29 Jul 50,
entries 219, 281407, and 220, 281415; 34th Inf WD, 25 Jul 50; Interv,
author with Beauchamp, 24 Sep 52; Interv author with Cheek (Ex Off, 13th
FA Bn, and with A Btry at Koch'ang in Jul 50) 7 Aug 51.
 Intervs, author with Beauchamp, 24 Sep 52, and Cheek, 7 Aug 51;
24th Div WD, 28 Jul 50; Ibid., G-3 Jnl, 23-29 Jul 50, entry 220, 281415.
 Interv, author with Beauchamp, 24 Sep 52.
 34th Inf WD, 29 Jul 50.
 Interv, author with Cheek, 7 Aug 51; Ltr, Ayres to author, 5 Jun 53
(Ayres commanded the 1st Bn, at Koch'ang); 13th FA Bn WD, 29 Jul 50;
Interv, author with Beauchamp, 24 Sep 52.
 Interv, author with Beauchamp, 24 Sep 52; 34th Inf WD, 29 Jul 50;
34th Div WD, 30 Jul 50; ATIS 34th Inf, Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 94
(N.K. 4th Div), p. 48.
 24th Div WD, 30 Jul 50; Interv, author with Church, 25 Sep 52. The
34th Infantry War Diary for 29 July says that the ROK 17th Regiment was
in position that day.
 EUSAK WD, PIR 19, 31 Jul 50.
 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, entry 206, 281245 Jul 50; Ltrs, Rhea to
author, 9 Apr and 21 Sep 53.
 24th Div WD, G-2 Jnl, entries 1651, 290755, and 1753, 290818 Jul
50; Ibid., G-3 Jnl, entries 247, 29100, and 260, 291145 Jul 50.
 Interv, author with Montesclaros, 20 Aug 52; 24th Div WD, 29 Jul
50; 19th Inf WD, 29 Jul 50.
 Ltr, Barszcz to author, 30 Jul 52; 24th Div WD, 30 Jul 50; 19th Inf
WD, 30 Jul 50. Civilians in the Chinju area seemed openly hostile to
American troops and friendly to the enemy. Refugees had to be watched
closely. Interv, Blumenson with Herbert, 31 Jul 51.
 Ltr, Barszcz to author, 30 Jul 52; Notes, Montesclaros (Asst S-3,
2d Bn, 19th Inf) for author, n.d.; Interv, Blumenson with Herbert, 31
 19th Inf Unit Rpt 21 30 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, entry 386,
312325 Jul 50; EUSAK WD POR 53, 30 Jul 50; GHQ UNC G-3 Opn Rpt, 31 Jul
 19th Inf WD, Narr Summ, 22 Jul-25 Aug 50; Intervs, author with
Moore, 20 Aug 52, and McGrail 24 Oct 52.
 Ltr, Rhea to author, 9 Apr 53; Ltr, Barszcz to author, 21 Aug 52;
Interv, Blumenson with 2d Lt Joseph Szito, 25 Aug 51, Action in Chinju,
in OCMH. Szito, in July 1950, was in the Mortar Platoon, H Company, 19th
 Ltr, Barszcz to author, 30 Jul 52; Interv, Blumenson with Herbert,
31 Jul 51.
 19th Inf Unit Rpt 22, 31 Jul 50; Interv, author with McGrail, 24
Oct 52; Interv, Blumenson with Szito, 25 Aug 51.
 Interv, Blumenson with Szito, 25 Aug 51.
 Ltr, Barszcz to author, 30 Jul 52; Interv, Blumenson with Herbert,
31 Jul 51; Moore, Notes for author, Jul 53.
 Ltrs, Rhea to author, 9 Apr and 21 Sep 53, together with sketch map
of 1st Bn positions, 28-31 Jul 50.
 Ibid.; Ltr, Maj Elliot C. Cutler, Jr., to author, 9 Mar 53. Cutler
was Acting S-3, 19th Infantry, at the time.
 Intervs, author with Moore and Montesclaros, 20 Aug 52; 24th Div
WD, 31 Jul 50; 25th Div WD, 3d Bn, 27th Inf, Hist Rpt, Aug 50; New York
Times, August 1, 1950, W. H. Lawrence dispatch from southwestern front;
13th FA Bn WD, 31 Jul 50.
 Interv, author with Moore, 20 Aug 52: Interv, Blumenson with Szito,
25 Aug 51.
 Intervs, author with Moore, 20 Aug 52, and McGrail, 24 Oct 52; Ltr,
Cutler to author, 9 Mar 53; 13th FA Bn WD, 31 Jul 50.
 19th Inf Unit Rpt 22, 31 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, G-2 Jnl, entry 10,
010255 Aug 50; Ibid., G-3 Jnl, entry 421, 011800 Aug 50.
 EUSAK Inspector General Rpt (Col William 0. Perry), Three M26 Tanks
at Chinju, 31 Jul 50, dated 10 Sep 50.
 Ibid., testimonies of Col Moore, Maj Emery, Capt Applegate (RTO
Off, Masan), Pvt Harold Delmar; Interv, author with Moore, 20 Aug 52.
 EUSAK IG Rpt, testimony of Capt John W. Coyle, Jr. (CO 8066th Mech
Rec Det), 2d Lt Vincent P. Geske, Sgt Francis A. Hober, and MSgt Bryant
E. W. Shrader (C Co, 88th Tk Bn), Pfc Carl Anderson; ATIS Res Supp
Interrog Rpts, Issue 1, Rpt 1, p. 119, Capt Pak Tong Huk.
 EUSAK IG Rpt, testimony of Pfc Anderson.
 Ltr, Col Wesley C. Wilson to author, 13 Jun 53; Holliday, Notes for
author, 31 Mar 53.
 Holliday, Notes for author, 31 Mar 53.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation