3rd Infantry Division provided a
vital safety point at Chinhung-ni, for the First
Marine Division in its Fight-Out from the Chosin
Reservoir.
COL. GEORGE O. TAYLOR JR., USA
Ret.
TF Dog, as it was designated, was
to be commanded by Brig. Gen. Armistead D. Mead,
the assistant commander of our division. The major
combat elements of TF Dog were our battalion and
the 92nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion, which
was equipped with 155 mm howitzers. The mission of
the task force was to move on December 7 to
Chinhung-ni, about nine miles north of Majon-dong,
to assist the 1st Marine Division in its
withdrawal. Initially, it was to relieve the 1st
Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, the most southern
Marine unit. Thereafter, the 1st Battalion,
commanded by Lt. Col. Donald M. Schmuck, was to
attack to the northeast and seize key terrain.
The advance party was composed of
several soldiers from each company. The convoy
consisted of eight to ten trucks. The day was
dreary and extremely cold. The MSR was the only
road to the reservoir area. It wound through a
valley with high mountains on both sides which
sometimes abruptly abutted one side of the road.
The MSR was reported to be "open." That
sounded doubtful since there were no friendly
troops positioned between Majon-dong and
Chinhung-ni and our patrols had encountered the
enemy in the lower part of the area. The valley
looked very ominous.
There was cause to worry about the
enemy occupying the high ground on both sides of
the MSR. The resemblance to the 23rd Psalm's
"valley of the shadow of death" was
inescapable to us. All went well during the first
part of the trip, but about a mile or two from
Chinhung-ni, our convoy came under small arms fire
from the left. The lead vehicle increased its
speed, and all others moved out rapidly. A Marine
outpost soon provided the chance to stop for a
casualty assessment. One noncommissioned officer,
an occupant of one of the rearward trucks, was
found to be dead. There were no other casualties.
Shortly thereafter, it was reported that a Marine
convoy of 13 vehicles had been destroyed just
minutes behind us on the MSR. Possibly, more enemy
troops had come within firing range of the MSR soon
after we had passed. Initially, our advance party
had been told it would return to Majon-dong later
that day. It was good news to us when we received
instructions to spend the night with the Marines
and wait there until TF Dog arrived the next day.
TF Dog arrived at Chinhung-ni as scheduled on
December 7. It had met only light enemy contact
during the movement. The 3rd Division's 65th
Infantry Regiment had assisted TF Dog by acting as
its flank guard for the first two miles north of
Majon-dong. Although the 65th returned to defensive
positions at Majon-dong, its G Company later
assisted the task force by occupying commanding
terrain in the vicinity of Sudong.
Our battalion promptly relieved the
Marine battalion in place, freeing it to plan for
its attack within the safety of the Army's
perimeter. All of L Company's positions were on
the west side of the MSR. My platoon's
positions were on the north edge of the task
force's perimeter on the valley floor, abutting
the west side of the MSR on one side and rising
partly up the mountainside on the other flank.
Friedlander's and Smith's platoons were
deployed well west of my platoon. We could see the
MSR wind over the mountains as it ascended to our
front. About three miles to the north and near
where the MSR disappeared over the mountains, a
large gap in the road was visible. The Chinese had
blown up the bridge at that location. There was no
way for the Marines to bypass this obstacle with
their vehicles since there was a steep mountain on
one side and a high drop-off on the other side. The
Marines lacked the bridging necessary to replace
the blown bridge. On December 7, several sections
of bridging were dropped by parachute to them. It
was thrilling to see the planes fly over with the
bridge sections hanging underneath them. All was
quiet in the perimeter that night.
Schmuck's battalion moved out
early on the morning of December 8 and encountered
strong resistance. It was assisted in its attack by
Company A, 73rd Engineer Combat Battalion, a X
Corps unit that accompanied TF Dog. The Marines
were also assisted by TF Dog's self-propelled
antiaircraft and 155 mm artillery units. The 155 mm
fire on Hill 1081, the Marine objective, was
particularly effective. The Marines took a major
portion of their objective December 8, but they
were unable to secure the military crest of Hill
1081. By midafternoon of December 9, Schmuck's
A Company succeeded in seizing the crest of Hill
1081. A few hours later, construction of the bridge
was complete and the first of the Marine vehicles
began to cross it. The stubborn defense conducted
by the enemy on Hill 1081 illustrates the great
importance the Chinese placed on retaining this
position. The enemy fought to the last man, leaving
530 dead along A Company's path up Hill 1081.
The attack had cost A Company 111 men, about half
its strength.
The enemy did not launch any major
attack against our positions at Chinhung-ni. This
was surprising since they had units well south of
us. They did probe our positions on a few
occasions, but none of these could be classified as
heavy. One probe occurred about 8:00 p.m. on
December 8 in the area where Friendlander's
platoon was deployed. It started with rifle fire,
automatic weapons fire and small mortar rounds.
Within a few minutes the firing became intense and
involved a large part of the western half of the
perimeter. The next morning, it appeared Chinese
casualties were minimal. Friedlander felt only a
small enemy reconnaissance patrol had been
involved. During the early morning hours of
December 11, some of the batteries of the 92nd
Field Artillery Battalion received enemy small arms
fire. There was a lively fire-fight for about 30
minutes, but the losses were small on both sides.
Although our patrols did not make any substantial
contact with the enemy, the task force did capture
a few prisoners. Rather than hitting TF Dog hard,
it appeared that the Chinese were concentrating
their efforts in the area of Sudong. The task
force's reconnaissance platoon and artillery
battalion and also G Company of the 65th Infantry
were involved in several actions against the enemy
in that area.
Our mission became primarily one of
watching anxiously and waiting for the Marines to
come over the mountains and cross the bridge.
Temperatures in the area dipped well below zero,
reportedly as low as 35 degrees below zero. Each
hour seemed like an eternity.
The first Marines reached
Chinhung-ni very early on the morning of December
10. It was evident that the brave men in the Marine
column had experienced heavy fighting and terrible
hardship. Ed Smith has said that "each vehicle
had as many Marines as it could carry; if it had a
bumper, ... a fender, ... or a gun barrel, dead
Marines were [tied] to them." He feels that he
will never "erase the sight from [his]
mind." It is quite remarkable that they were
able to survive the onslaught of the enemy's
seemingly unlimited manpower and still remain a
viable fighting force.
The fighting was not over, however,
for those in the Marine column. The enemy still
tried to block their way between Chinhung-ni and
Majon-dong. Army Lt. Col. John U. Page, an
artillery officer, was part of that column. He had
already performed a number of valuable services for
the Marines after becoming entrapped with them at
Koto-ri while assigned by X Corps to establish
communication points on the MSR. When the 1st
Marine Regiment's trains were ambushed by about
30 Chinese, he led two Marines in a charge straight
into the enemy. The Chinese fled with Page chasing
after them.
At Chinhung-ni, many Marines
boarded trucks of TF Dog's 52nd Truck
Transportation Battalion for the trip south. This
battalion was commanded by Lt. Col. Waldon C.
Winston. When Page failed to return, Winston took
over the leadership at Sudong and organized a
Marine and Army counterattack. The fighting lasted
for several hours. Shortly after the column moved
through Sudong, Page was found dead with 16 dead
Chinese bodies near him. Page was posthumously
awarded the Navy Cross and Medal of Honor.
The last of the Marine column
cleared Chinhung-ni early in the afternoon of
December 11. It was several hours after that before
our company started to withdraw. The mobile parts
of TF Dog were the first elements on the MSR behind
the Marine column. The engineers went first and
were followed by the artillery battalion with task
force headquarters, the small support detachments,
and the command group dispersed between artillery
batteries. TF Dog's movement order indicated
that our battalion was to follow the last of these
units. Lt. Col. Alvin L. Newbury, the task force
executive officer, has stated that our battalion
"simultaneously ... started southward afoot
occupying and successively passing through delaying
positions along the ridges." My platoon was
not involved in providing that flank security.
Rather, it was one of the last elements to leave
Chihung-ni. Because of our position next to the
MSR, we were in the best location to act as a rear
guard to cover the other units as they moved from
their positions onto the MSR.
The Marines had established a large
stockpile of supplies at Chinhung-ni. TF Dog had
earlier sent some of it to the rear by truck, but a
large amount of canned food, ammunition and fuel
remained. TF Dog left its reconnaissance platoon
and a demolition party behind to destroy what
remained.
Shortly after my platoon moved onto
the MSR, we came under rather heavy small arms and
automatic weapons fire from our right. The enemy
had wasted no time moving into the task force's
former positions. We took cover in a narrow ditch
on the left side of the road that abutted a
mountainside. Before long the enemy fire was
neutralized. We arose and started our march south
again. The column stopped several times for what
seemed like long periods. This was probably due to
delays at Sudong where the enemy chose to make the
most trouble.
It was in the vicinity of Sudong
where Gen. Mead's aide, 1st Lt. Harley F.
Mooney Jr., was wounded by a mortar round that
struck the hood of the vehicle he was riding in.
Also at Sudong, Ed Smith found "the area
strewn with dead Chinese and dead Marines."
Some of the Marines had died in their vehicles,
which had been pushed off the road. Most of these
probably had been with the Marine trains. I did not
see this since darkness fell before my platoon
reached Sudong. Both Smith's and
Friedlander's platoons were assigned an
off-the-road mission during the withdrawal. Two of
Ed Smith's Korean soldiers were killed on one
of these.
After darkness fell, the valley
seemed even more foreboding than it had on the trip
up. It was easy to imagine Chinese hordes, under
the cover of darkness, streaming down the steep
hills on each side of our vulnerable column.
Fortunately this did not happen. There was
intermittent firing after passing Sudong, but it
was insignificant. It seemed as if friendly lines
would never be reached. It has been reported that
TF Dog closed into Majon-dong at 8:00 p.m. on
December 11 when it passed through the defensive
positions of the 65th Infantry Regiment. It seemed
much later.
Possibly because of TF Dog's
low casualty rate and short five-day participation
in the Chosin operations, many authors have
overlooked the importance of its role. With no
intent to detract from the Marines and TF Faith, it
seems appropriate to also assess the importance of
TF Dog's contributions.
Schmuck's battalion was
positioned on critical ground at Chinhung-ni. On
December 6, the Chinese had cut the MSR above and
below Chinhung-ni which, according to one Marine
author, made this battalion "the most
isolated, vulnerable, and endangered unit in the
division." Replacement of the blown bridge was
essential for a successful Marine withdrawal.
Otherwise, it would have been virtually impossible
for them to escape with their vehicles. The Chinese
occupied Hill 1081, which overlooked the bridge
site. Before the bridge could be built, it was
necessary for friendly troops to occupy that hill
or, at least, divert the enemy's attention from
the construction of the bridge. Distinguished
Korean War author Roy E. Appleman in his book
Escaping the Trap described Hill 1081 as the
"most dominating and critical enemy position
on the way down" from Koto-ri to Chinhung-ni.
If Schmuck's battalion left its positions
unoccupied at Chinhung-ni, the enemy would most
certainly have occupied that key terrain from which
they could have delivered effective firepower onto
the bridge site and a large part of the MSR. As an
added bonus, they also would have captured the
large stockpile of Marine supplies located there.
If Schmuck's battalion had not been used to
attack Hill 1081, it may have been possible for a
Marine unit moving southward from Koto-ri to do so,
but that most likely would have substantially
delayed the withdrawal and resulted in more Marine
casualties. Thus, by occupying and holding the
positions at Chinhung-ni, a small group from the
3rd Infantry Division ensured that the extrication
of the Marines and their attached units from the
Chinese entrapment was successful. That small force
was TF Dog.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation
The Foundations of Freedom are the Courage of Ordinary People and Quality of our Arms
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